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1 Introduction 
Rising powers such as Brazil, China, India, South Africa, the Gulf states or Turkey have 
entered the development arena through their expanding relationships with low-income 
countries (LICs). A widespread perception is that these countries are establishing new forms 
of engagement, mainly under the South–South cooperation framework, which can be defined 
as: (i) two-way or equal partner relationships, as opposed to the engagement of traditional 
donors that is seen as relying on conditionality; and (ii) extending cooperation beyond aid 
flows to include trade, investment, finance and other flows. Other views, however, suggest 
that the importance of engagement from these countries is still small compared to traditional 
OECD donors, and highlight that established relationships can sometimes be more likely to 
satisfy the commercial and economic interests of these new donors. 
One region where this engagement has been increasing more significantly is sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA). Estimates suggest that over the last decade both trade and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) from emerging economies to Africa ballooned. Freemantle and Stevens 
(2012) report a trade increase from USD20 billion in 2001 to more than USD250 billion in 
2011 between Africa and a group of ten emerging economies (EEs). These new economic 
relationships represent new economic opportunities for African countries, at the same time 
as challenging existing relationships with traditional OECD partners. 
The objective of this report is to understand and measure the engagement of rising powers in 
SSA.1 Specifically, the report attempts to clarify the importance and nature of their 
engagement and the distinctiveness of their economic relationships with SSA, among the 
rising powers themselves and also in relation to traditional OECD donors, and to start 
analysing their likely development footprint arising from their economic engagement. 
In order to characterise their engagement and development impact, we adopt the South–
South cooperation framework and go beyond the analysis of aid flows. Specifically, we take 
stock of all the data and information available, and establish some generalisations facts 
about the rising powers’ economic engagement in SSA in relation to trade, FDI and aid flows. 
The ultimate objective of this report is to provide information to help answer a number of 
important policy questions: 
 How important is rising powers’ engagement in SSA? 
 What is the nature and what are the patterns of this engagement? 
 To what extent are the rising powers similar to or different from each other 
with respect to the characteristics of these flows? 
 To what extent are the footprints of the rising powers similar to or different 
from those of leading OECD countries? 
 What do the current level, past growth and projected future trends tell us 
about the present and future significance of relationships between rising 
powers and SSA compared to those between established donors and SSA? 
The analysis of these data sources is not new. The great economic and political interest in 
the rising powers has already generated many studies of their impact on developing 
countries. International organisations have produced a plethora of reports on the rising 
                                               
1
 By rising powers in this report we refer to Brazil, China, India, South Africa, the Gulf states and Turkey. These are economies 
that have been significantly increasing their engagement and influence in SSA. Please note that in some of the statistical 
information provided below we refer to the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) rather than South Africa because trade 
data in COMTRADE was only available for SACU (with South Africa representing a very large percentage of trade in the region). 
For investment and aid South Africa is reported individually. 
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powers and on South–South economic relationships more generally, and there have been 
important country-level studies of economic relationships between the powers and LICs, 
such as the detailed studies of China in Africa by Broadman (2006) and Brautigam (2009). In 
addition, substantial new research is being produced with new emerging datasets, which 
allow comparisons between donor countries (see, for example, Timmons Roberts, Findlay 
and Hawkins 2011). 
The distinctiveness of our approach lies in its ambition to bring together multiple sources of 
information on a broad range of economic relationships and to provide a comparative 
analysis of the footprints of rising powers in LICs, in terms of both how they differ from each 
other and the extent to which they are distinct from the OECD countries. 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives some background information about the 
nature of rising powers’ economic engagement, briefly summarises some of the related 
literature and puts forward some hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data used for the 
analysis. Section 4 analyses rising powers’ engagement in SSA. Section 5 concludes, 
summarising the main generalisations about rising powers’ engagement in SSA. 
The economic engagement footprint is a first aggregated approximation to the development 
impact of rising powers’ engagement in SSA. Understanding the broad development impact 
of this engagement requires more detailed micro-evaluations, which are beyond the scope of 
this report. The footprint will, however, help to identify ‘hot spots’ of interactions between 
rising power countries and SSA. This might be in terms of SSA countries that are particularly 
important economic partners for one or more of the rising powers, or where rising power 
countries have particularly salient footprints. It could also be used for analysis of thematic 
issues such as the role of the rising powers in particular sectors such as food or minerals. 
Overall, the economic engagement footprint shows some important findings. Some rising 
powers, especially China and India, are becoming important economic partners to SSA 
countries. This importance is especially significant in trade and FDI flows, and also for China 
in aid flows. Despite the existence of common guiding principles for some rising powers in 
relation to the South–South cooperation framework, allocation and the nature of flows among 
these countries in SSA does not appear highly similar. For some flows, while there are highly 
similar allocations among some rising powers, there also tend to be important similarities 
with some OECD countries. This suggests that the South–South cooperation framework is 
not translated into similar sector or country allocations of economic flows that are distinctive 
of these countries. This is likely to be the result of differing national objectives and economic 
structures among the rising powers. On the other hand, some of the concerns about the 
primacy of economic interests or a disregard for governance suggested as an outcome of aid 
allocation from these countries do not seem to translate in practice to allocation patterns 
differentiated from those of some OECD countries. 
Finally, in terms of potential development footprints two main issues emerge. Regarding 
trade, rising powers, especially China and Brazil, appear to exacerbate the pattern of primary 
commodity export existing with OECD countries, and concentrate on exports of even lower 
sophistication and technological content. This could reinforce the trend on negative structural 
change for SSA. Regarding FDI, however, investment from rising powers is quite diversified 
between different sectors, especially services, which could constitute a significant source of 
economic growth in the region. 
The findings of this report rely on the quality of existing data. However, significant gaps in the 
data were identified, particularly regarding the reliability of FDI flows, the completeness of aid 
data for rising powers and the availability of data for bilateral development finance and other 
forms of non-OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) cooperation. Priority should 
be given to gathering data in these areas in order to have a full picture of rising powers’ 
economic engagement. 
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2 Background: Why the footprint? 
As rising powers have entered the development arena through their expanding relationships 
with low-income countries, three diffused arguments have been made about the 
distinctiveness of these countries’ activities compared to those of the established donors. 
The first argument, advanced by the rising powers themselves, is that they are engaged in 
South–South cooperation, not the aid business. According to this view, cooperation implies a 
two-way relationship of equals, rather than the power imbalance implied by the donor–
recipient relationship. Even if one party is much more economically and politically powerful 
than the other, and assistance flows in only one direction, the argument is made that without 
a history of imperialism and sharing a recent common background of underdevelopment the 
rising powers are different.  
The second argument is that the scope of South–South cooperation extends beyond aid to 
include trade, investment and financial flows as well as development assistance. The 
argument here is that the positive developmental impacts of South–South cooperation 
extend beyond aid, and that the rising powers are promoting growth and prosperity through 
these broader relationships. 
The third argument, less frequently advanced by the rising power countries themselves, is 
that a fundamental rebalancing of the global economy is taking place such that the rising 
powers are becoming much more significant economic partners for LICs, especially in SSA. 
These three arguments can be summarised in four main hypotheses about rising powers’ 
economic engagement with SSA countries: 
1. The strength and importance of the rising powers’ economic engagement with 
SSA is increasing and becoming more important over time, especially in 
relation to OECD engagement. 
2. These countries engage with SSA in these areas (aid, trade and finance) in a 
different way from traditional OECD donors. 
3. Rising power approaches are similar among themselves (South–South 
cooperation) and distinguishable from OECD donors. 
4. This ‘differentiated’ approach embedded in South–South cooperation is 
translated into an additional development impact on SSA countries, especially 
compared to the impact of other OECD donors. 
Analysing the existing literature suggests that while some of the overarching principles of 
development cooperation may be similar for some of the rising powers, there are significant 
differences in objectives, instruments or implementation. Table 2.1 summarises some of 
these principles and objectives suggested by the literature (see Rowlands 2008). Regarding 
objectives, there are significant differences across rising powers in terms of objectives in 
SSA, with some countries, such as South Africa, more interested in political influence and 
others, such as India, more based on economic interests. This is translated into cooperation 
in different sectors and different countries, and also into using different instruments. One 
important element in Table 2.1 is the fact that development cooperation agencies depend 
mainly on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the exception of China where it depends on the 
Ministry of Commerce. In none of the countries do development cooperation implementing 
agencies have their own ministry. 
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Table 2.1 Basic principles of development cooperation in rising powers 
 Objectives Principles Instruments Sector Ministry 
responsible 
China Political influence in 
Asia 
Economic interest in 
Africa 
Win-win 
cooperation 
Non-interference 
Tied aid Infrastructure 
development 
More recently 
capacity building and 
social development 
Commerce 
India Geopolitical influence 
Asia focus, political 
stability 
Economic interest in 
Africa 
Fair relationship Tied aid 
Technical 
assistance 
Access to markets 
and energy 
Health and education 
(secondary) 
In Africa training and 
purchase of own 
products 
Competing with China 
on natural resources 
Foreign 
Affairs 
Brazil Latin America 
Portuguese Africa 
Political and 
economic interests 
Horizontal 
cooperation 
Technical 
assistance 
Varied Foreign 
Affairs 
South 
Africa 
Africa, mainly SADC 
Political interest 
African 
renaissance 
 Defence, security and 
education 
Foreign 
Affairs 
Gulf 
states 
Economic interest in 
Africa 
OECD framework 
to show policy 
credibility to OECD 
   
Source: Based mainly on Rowlands (2008) and other literature. 
Finally, in terms of principles – with the exception of the Gulf states, which joined the OECD 
DAC group with the objective of signalling credibility in relation to OECD countries – these 
appear to be relatively similar to the South–South cooperation framework described above. 
For Brazil, the guiding principle is horizontal cooperation, emphasising engagement between 
equals. For China, the main principles are non-interference and win-win cooperation. South 
Africa emphasises the ‘African renaissance’ and political influence in the rest of Africa. In 
India, mutual benefit is emphasised, and also fairness, especially in SSA where India has 
tried to differentiate itself from China (Agrawal 2007). The common idea of these principles is 
one that claims engagement between ‘equals’ without conditionality, and this is what 
according to some commentators and policymakers justifies categorising these countries as 
a group regarding development cooperation. 
Mwase and Yang (2012) differentiate development finance between the BRICS (Brazil, 
Russia, India and China) and OECD countries, arguing that in the former group development 
finance allocation is guided by mutual benefit while in the latter mainly by the objective of 
poverty reduction. However, while the guiding principle may be similar among rising powers, 
this has to be applied to very different objectives and to the use of different instruments, as 
suggested in Table 2.1. As a result, the question from a footprint perspective is whether the 
combination of this similar set of guiding principles under the South–South cooperation 
framework, with different objectives and instruments, is translated into similar country and 
sector allocations among the rising powers that could indicate the similarity of these 
countries as a group and a likely similar development impact. 
There are a few studies analysing development cooperation by rising powers (see Rowlands 
2008, for example). These papers tend to provide mainly qualitative reviews of development 
cooperation in these countries. One paper, however, that compares different donors, ‘old’ 
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(OECD) and ‘new’, using quantitative analysis is Dreher, Nunnenkamp and Thiele (2011). 
Interestingly, the authors find some differences between ‘new’ and ‘old’ donors in relation to 
aid allocation. Specifically, they find that although ‘new’ donors’ allocation is similar to that of 
‘old’ donors, ‘new’ donors do not tend to consider corruption levels in their allocation rules. 
The authors also find that commercial interests are not important for either group. While their 
paper provides some interesting findings to understand the ‘differentiated’ impact of rising 
powers engagement, these findings are confined to aid flows and do not consider the 
importance of other types of engagement emphasised in the South–South cooperation 
framework. 
In the rest of this paper we describe the economic engagement of rising powers in SSA and 
look at the hypothesis of ‘similarity’ and ‘differentiation’ among rising powers and with 
traditional OECD donors across three types of flows: trade, FDI and aid. 
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3 Data and methodology 
In order to build a clear picture of the economic engagement of rising powers in SSA we look 
at three types of flow: trade (both exports and imports), FDI and aid flows. Other flows such 
as migration, technology, ideas and especially other types of finance are also likely to have a 
development impact in recipient countries. However, it is very difficult to find meaningful data 
on the size and allocation of these flows in SSA. As a result, we focus on these three types 
of flow, which are critical in terms of economic impacts and development footprint. 
In relation to trade flows we use the BACI dataset by CEPII. This dataset is based on the UN 
Comtrade database, which collects all exports and imports for most countries in the world at 
Harmonized System HS-6 digits, which is the most disaggregated commodity classification 
available where product categories are comparable across countries. The advantage of the 
BACI dataset is that it corrects some missing export flows that are prevalent in developing 
countries by using mirror statistics. Specifically, we build a dataset of bilateral exports and 
imports from all SSA countries at the HS-6 level for the period 2000 to 2010 using the HS 
revision of 1992 to avoid changes in classification that may distort the data. 
FDI data are more challenging to collect and less available than trade flows. While trade 
flows are captured mainly via customs controls, FDI data (especially data disaggregated 
bilaterally and by sector) are more difficult to find. One challenge presented by FDI data is 
that bilateral FDI flows between two countries may not physically flow from one country to the 
other. This is explained by the fact that companies, especially multinationals, have 
subsidiaries outside their country of origin, which may transfer the capital flows necessary for 
the investment. In these cases, FDI measured at origin by Central Bank authorities are likely 
to miss a significant number of investments. A second challenge is the lack of information on 
the sector composition of these investments. 
In relation to FDI flows we started by using a dataset of bilateral FDI flows from the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The dataset appears to be more 
complete for OECD countries than for rising powers. However, the amount of FDI flows for 
countries such as Brazil, China or India appears very low and does not match the evidence 
described in reports that look at investments in SSA. As a result, we use an FDI dataset 
compiled by the Financial Times. The advantage of this dataset is that it appears mainly to 
capture investments at destination, and, therefore, appears more reliable. The main 
shortcomings of the dataset, however, are that it does not disaggregate all flows bilaterally 
and it is not always clear whether investments announced have been disbursed. In our 
dataset, information is only available for all of SSA as a region and for Nigeria, Ghana, 
Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia individually. Information on sector allocation is also 
described in terms of the number of projects and not in terms of values. Despite these 
shortcomings we primarily use the FT FDI dataset given the striking lack of FDI flows from 
rising powers to SSA in the UNCTAD dataset. The results corresponding to sector FDI 
allocation, however, need to be interpreted with caution since we do not have sector values. 
Finally, in relation to aid flows we use the OECD DAC dataset that includes all bilateral aid 
flows by DAC-3 digits sector for the OECD DAC countries including, for 2009 and 2010, 
some Gulf states. For the remaining rising powers, mainly Brazil, India and South Africa, we 
use harmonised data from aiddata.org, which compiles all projects for these countries that 
can be classified as aid using the OECD DAC sector classification and facilitates the 
comparison of flows with OECD DAC donors. For China, however, aiddata.org data lack 
information on values for a very large number of projects and cannot be added to the 
dataset. In order to have some information on Chinese aid allocation, we use data on 
bilateral development cooperation flows provided by China’s Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM) for the period 2000–2009. Since these values correspond to a broader definition 
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of development cooperation that includes other financial flows not considered as aid by the 
OECD DAC, we adjust the flows based on Brautigam (2011) estimates of Chinese 
cooperation with SSA that are DAC equivalent for 2008 and 2009, which amount to around 
eight per cent of the MOFCOM flows. Unfortunately, although the dataset on aid flows is 
complete for OECD and most rising powers, with the exception of Turkey, for bilateral flows, 
China is excluded from the sector allocation of flows due to lack of information. 
The final dataset includes information on origin, destination, product/sector and year, trade 
(both export and import) and aid flows, and one FDI dataset that includes the origin of 
investments for FDI in SSA and the number of project by sector. The period of analysis is 
from 2000 to 2010. 
This dataset allows construction of a footprint of economic engagement of rising powers in 
SSA. The objective is to map whether South–South cooperation is translated into a 
differentiated economic engagement from the engagement of more traditional donors. We do 
so in stages. In the first stage we analyse the importance of these countries’ engagement in 
SSA. As suggested earlier, different authors have provided specific accounts of the 
increasing importance of these flows but these tend to focus on specific sectors, countries or 
types of flow. We aim to provide a picture of the importance of these countries in SSA 
considering the three types of flow. 
In the second stage we attempt to provide more detail on country allocation of flows in SSA. 
In doing so, we go beyond countries and sectors to also analyse the concentration of aid 
allocation across country characteristics in terms of income per capita, trade interests, levels 
of governance and natural resource exploitation. 
To better capture and measure whether there is a ‘differentiated’ engagement by rising 
powers, in a third stage we look at similarities in countries and sector allocations within rising 
powers and between rising powers and OECD countries, both for each individual flow and for 
clustering across different types of flows. Similarity indexes using the Finger-Kreinin 
measures are computed and combined to identify donor pairs that are highly similar or highly 
different in their country and sector allocation. 
Finally, in the fourth stage we start analysing the issue of development impact. Specifically 
we focus on the type of trade, investment and aid flows engagement from these countries 
and discuss what types of flow are more or less conducive to different development impacts. 
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4 Measuring the economic engagement of 
rising powers in SSA 
4.1 Size and importance of flows 
It is important to start the analysis by quantifying the size and importance of the flows to 
SSA. 
4.1.1 Trade flows 
A significant number of studies have suggested that BRICS countries are becoming 
important trading partners for SSA. In this section we document how important these 
countries are as trade partners, going beyond BRICS (excluding Russia) and including the 
other rising powers. 
Figure 4.1 shows the evolution of import shares in SSA from 2000 to 2010. Two elements 
clearly emerge from the figure. The first is the phenomenal increase of China as the main 
exporter to SSA, increasing its share from around 4.5 per cent in 2000 to 14.5 per cent in 
2010. Mainly driven by China, the share of rising powers increases to more than 30 per cent 
in 2010. The second element is a steady decline in imports originated in OECD countries. 
Figure 4.1 Main sources of imports to SSA, 2000–2010 
 
Regarding the other rising powers, South Africa, an important trade partner given its location 
in the continent, experienced a mild decrease in its share during the period, from 5.3 per cent 
to 4.9 per cent. India, on the other hand, doubled its market share from 2.35 per cent to 4.7 
per cent to become almost as important an import source as South Africa. Saudi Arabia is 
the fourth rising power in terms of import shares in SSA, but its importance is mainly 
explained by petroleum products and is decreasing over time. Brazil and UAE have also 
increased their market share during the period, but this was still low and below 2 per cent in 
2010. The remaining rising powers’ shares appear to be marginal. 
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Figure 4.2 shows the evolution of country shares for SSA exports. Exports are dominated by 
the large amount of petroleum exports to the USA. However, once we exclude exports to the 
USA, we observe a similar pattern to the one identified with imports flows, with rising powers 
becoming the destination for 28 per cent of exports in 2010. Exports to China tripled during 
the period. India is the second export destination, followed by South Africa. Brazil is an 
increasing export destination but still with a low share. The data also show declining shares 
for most OECD countries, and that the Gulf states and Turkey are still marginal export 
partners with shares around 0.5 per cent. 
Figure 4.2 Main export destinations from SSA, 2000–2010 
 
Overall the results confirm an important reallocation of trade shares from OECD to rising 
power countries, mainly China and to a lesser extent India. Brazil is also becoming more 
important as a trade partner and South Africa is losing some importance as a source of 
imports but increasing its share as a destination for exports. In addition, the importance of 
these countries is increasing over time: in 2010 China, India and South Africa were among 
the first five import sources and export destinations for SSA. The role of the remaining rising 
powers is still marginal for SSA trade. 
4.1.2 FDI flows 
In order to determine the importance of FDI flows we use the FT dataset which shows 
aggregate FDI flows for all SSA by origin. Table 4.1 shows investment shares for the top 15 
investors in SSA for the period 2003 to 2011. The USA, the UK and France have been the 
largest investors on average during the period. Of the rising powers, India is the largest 
investor in terms of flows, with 7.69 per cent of flows on average, followed by China with 6.33 
per cent, South Africa with 5.12 per cent, United Arab Emirates with 2.77 per cent and Brazil 
2.18 per cent. 
Table 4.1 suggests that most rising powers, especially the BRICS countries, have been 
important investors in SSA in the last decade, mainly led by India and China. In 2011, FDI 
from rising powers represented 27.6 per cent of flows to SSA. 
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Table 4.1 FDI shares in SSA, 2003–2011 (%) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Average 
USA 22.67 36.43 24.94 17.03 7.51 18.37 10.90 6.72 9.03 17.07 
UK 15.23 2.36 7.88 7.06 8.39 13.14 10.26 13.94 16.25 10.50 
France 12.44 13.23 7.19 8.57 3.00 4.68 10.95 9.52 1.49 7.90 
India 0.38 11.20 1.08 19.58 1.07 6.83 6.65 6.97 15.47 7.69 
Canada 9.64 6.70 16.37 4.77 2.21 14.88 1.31 1.79 3.96 6.85 
China 6.75 1.18 1.14 7.16 9.80 12.52 6.10 10.17 2.15 6.33 
Australia 10.34 3.03 9.95 3.38 8.38 5.11 2.44 4.61 4.09 5.70 
South Africa 4.82 4.99 0.65 3.01 5.22 1.61 12.68 6.14 6.92 5.12 
UAE 0.72 0.22 1.19 2.89 10.62 2.67 3.97 2.10 0.59 2.77 
Italy 2.58 1.20 0.39 5.30 6.17 0.32 2.38 0.02 3.97 2.48 
Brazil 5.10 0.02 3.93 0.01 4.07 1.27 1.50 1.23 2.45 2.18 
Germany 0.62 0.70 2.15 1.34 0.69 0.47 6.91 4.51 2.00 2.15 
Netherlands 0.95 0.05 12.22 0.48 0.07 1.47 0.97 1.67 0.68 2.06 
Japan 0.69 1.43 0.86 1.45 9.03 0.13 1.75 0.40 1.74 1.94 
Russia 0.16 1.08 0.24 2.85 1.34 0.54 2.00 3.87 1.00 1.45 
Source: Author’s elaboration from FT data. 
4.1.3 Aid flows 
Describing trends in development cooperation flows is challenging given the existing different 
definitions for non-DAC donors. As suggested above, for Brazil, India and some of the Gulf 
states we use data available from the aiddata.org project, which collected data on 
development assistance projects that can be categorised under any of the OECD DAC 
sectors. This list may omit some important aid projects, but to our knowledge it represents 
the best source of harmonised data available. In the case of China we use the adjustment to 
MOFCOM figures of development cooperation based on Brautigam (2011) estimates for 
2008 and 2009 OECD DAC equivalents for China’s flows that represent around 8 per cent of 
the published figures on development cooperation. 
Figure 4.3 plots the shares for OECD and rising powers, with the exception of Turkey for 
which there were no data available. Aid flows continue to be dominated by OECD donors, 
mainly the USA, France and the UK. However, China was already in 2009, and considering 
adjusted figures, the fourth most important donor in the region, with shares similar to Japan 
and Germany, just above 5 per cent. According to the data, total aid flows share for rising 
powers in 2009 was 9.2 per cent. 
Regarding the remaining rising powers, the data suggest that India is the second largest 
donor of the group followed by the Gulf states, but all with shares below 2 per cent. Finally, 
South Africa and Brazil are the two donors with lower development assistance according to 
this dataset, with shares below 0.2 per cent. 
It is possible that these results represent an underestimate of aid flows due to the omission 
of some projects for rising powers. However, it is also likely that some of these low numbers 
are explained by the fact that other concessional flows that do not count as aid under DAC 
rules are a significant proportion of these countries’ development cooperation. In any case, 
the data show the importance of China as a donor and the increasing importance of India 
and the Gulf states. 
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Figure 4.3 Aid shares by donor, 2000–2010 
 
The main results regarding the size and importance of rising power economic engagement in 
SSA suggest that rising powers are significant economic players in SSA in relation to trade 
and FDI and are capturing significant shares from OECD countries, whose importance has 
been decreasing. China is the main driver in the increase of trade, while both India and 
China lead FDI flows. Brazil and the Gulf states have been increasing their importance in the 
region significantly but are still not major players, while South Africa has kept its significance 
in the region stagnant. On the other hand, Turkey still has a more marginal role in the region 
in terms of trade and FDI flows. Regarding aid, with the exception of China aid 
disbursements by rising powers are still small compared to the main OECD countries. 
4.2 Concentration of flows 
While the overall size of the economic engagement is important, it is also critical to describe 
the patterns of concentration of this economic engagement. To this end, we first describe the 
concentration across countries and across sectors. Finally, in order to better understand the 
allocation of these flows, we analyse concentration across country economic and 
governance characteristics. 
4.2.1 Country concentration 
Table 4.2 shows the concentration of export markets and import sources for the largest EE 
traders with SSA. As expected, exports from rising powers are more diversified than imports 
and concentrate on larger markets. The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and 
Nigeria tend to be the main export destinations for the rising powers. South Africa exports in 
the region concentrate in neighbouring countries. Sudan is also an important export market 
in the region for China, India and Saudi Arabia. 
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Table 4.2 Average market share for main rising powers trading partners, 
2000–2010 
Rising powers Main export markets (%) Main import sources from SSA (%) 
Brazil SACU 27.96 Nigeria 72.37 
Nigeria 26.20 SACU 12.66 
Angola 15.66 Angola 5.66 
Ghana 5.27 Equatorial Guinea 2.60 
Senegal 2.49 Congo 2.16 
China SACU 30.45 Angola 32.56 
Nigeria 17.38 Sudan 20.97 
Sudan 6.21 SACU 16.15 
Benin 5.10 Congo 7.43 
Ghana 3.66 Equatorial Guinea 5.78 
India SACU 18.65 Angola 39.76 
Nigeria 15.09 Benin 36.13 
Kenya 8.61 Burkina Faso 5.48 
Mauritius 6.70 Burundi 2.50 
Sudan 5.71 Cameroon 2.45 
SACU Zimbabwe 17.49 Nigeria 24.07 
Zambia 14.06 Zimbabwe 20.21 
Mozambique 11.66 Angola 9.67 
Angola 8.51 Mali 9.51 
Nigeria 7.08 Ghana 9.48 
Saudi Arabia SACU 53.27 Benin 41.96 
Sudan 14.57 Burkina Faso 18.69 
Ethiopia 9.76 Burundi 15.56 
Kenya 7.33 Cameroon 6.77 
Djibouti 7.10 Cape Verde 6.76 
Source: Author’s compilation using BACI data. 
Regarding imports sources, Table 4.2 shows a significantly more concentrated geographical 
picture, explained by the SSA specialisation pattern in primary commodities such as 
petroleum and minerals. More than 70 per cent of Brazilian imports originated in SSA come 
from Nigeria. In the case of China, more than 50 per cent of SSA imports on average 
originated in oil-producing countries such as Angola, Sudan and Equatorial Guinea. For 
India, imports are concentrated in oil imports from Angola, as well as agricultural imports 
from countries such as Benin. A similar pattern applies to South Africa, whose imports are 
concentrated in oil from Nigeria and Angola, and agricultural products and electricity from 
Zimbabwe. Saudi Arabia’s imports from SSA are derived mainly from exporters of agricultural 
products such as Benin. 
In order to analyse the country allocation of FDI we try to use the UNCTAD bilateral FDI 
dataset, since the FT dataset that we use does not provide such information on bilateral 
flows for all SSA countries. Unfortunately, the dataset is largely incomplete for rising powers 
and captures hardly any investments to SSA. However, to have an idea on the bilateral 
composition of flows for some rising powers, we check national sources for China and Brazil. 
Table 4.3 shows the main destinations of Chinese investments in SSA according to 
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MOFCOM. Chinese FDI is very largely concentrated in South Africa, with more than half of 
FDI in the period 2003–2010. The second destination was Nigeria with just above 10 per 
cent, followed by Zambia with 5.77 per cent. Interestingly, according to MOFCOM, oil-rich 
countries such as Sudan and Angola only received 3.14 per cent and 1.51 per cent of FDI 
flows during the period. 
Table 4.3 Destinations of Chinese FDI, 2003–2010 by share 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total Percentage 
share 
South Africa 8.86 17.81 47.47 40.74 454.41 4,807.86 41.59 411.17 5,829.91 53.74% 
Nigeria 24.40 45.52 53.30 67.79 390.35 162.56 171.86 184.89 1,100.67 10.15% 
Zambia 5.53 2.23 10.09 87.44 119.34 213.97 111.80 75.05 625.45 5.77% 
DRC 0.06 11.91 5.07 36.73 57.27 23.99 227.16 236.19 598.38 5.52% 
Niger 0.00 1.53 5.76 7.94 100.83 -0.01 39.87 196.25 352.17 3.25% 
Sudan 0.00 146.70 91.13 50.79 65.40 -63.14 19.30 30.96 341.14 3.14% 
Ethiopia 0.98 0.43 4.93 23.95 13.28 9.71 74.29 58.53 186.10 1.72% 
Kenya 0.74 2.68 2.05 0.18 8.90 23.23 28.12 101.22 167.12 1.54% 
Madagascar 0.68 13.64 0.14 1.17 13.24 61.16 42.56 33.58 166.17 1.53% 
Angola 0.19 0.18 0.47 22.39 41.19 -9.57 8.31 101.11 164.27 1.51% 
Source: MOFCOM. 
For Brazil, information from the Central Bank also appears to have large gaps in the data on 
investments to SSA. According to this source, the overall FDI for the period 2001–2010 in 
SSA amounted to $570 million, 83 per cent of which was concentrated in Angola and 11 per 
cent in Mozambique, which clearly shows stronger affinity of investors with the two 
Lusophone countries, especially Angola. The amount invested in other countries is marginal 
and does not correspond to some of the information available in other documents and 
reports. 
Finally, Table 4.4 shows the main destinations of aid flows for rising powers. For Brazil, the 
table confirms the importance of Lusophone Africa for Brazilian assistance, which absorbs 
most of the assistance to SSA. For China, perhaps with the exception of Tanzania, there is a 
strong alignment between the main destinations of exports, FDI and aid flows according to 
the data available. India, on the other hand, does not appear to allocate most aid flows to its 
main trade partners; while South Africa allocates mainly to neighbours and a few other 
African countries. Finally, the country allocation of aid for the Gulf states does not appear to 
match their export destinations in SSA. 
In terms of total concentration, aid disbursement appears to be more concentrated in a few 
countries for Brazil and South Africa, but much less so in the remaining countries. 
Overall, the results regarding country concentration suggest significant concentration of 
exports from SSA to rising powers in a few countries. China shows some alignment between 
FDI and aid allocation, and Brazil’s FDI and aid flows are largely concentrated in Lusophone 
countries, while most imports come from Nigeria. South Africa’s main economic relationships 
are with neighbouring countries and India appears more country diversified. 
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Table 4.4 Main recipients of rising powers aid flows (%) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Brazil 
 
Cape Verde     99.43 5.27 37.89 8.54 21.51 19.20 6.34 
Mozambique     0.57 4.52 23.03 21.67 40.07 2.51 56.46 
Sao Tome and Principe     0.00 18.11  16.83 3.14 64.84 14.17 
Guinea-Bissau      63.51  0.63 13.71 1.03 6.72 
Angola      5.37 21.26 25.26 10.32 6.62 4.39 
China 
 
Sudan 9.86 19.03 26.21 2.71 25.32 1.66 25.09 24.01 18.48 10.83  
SACU 9.77 7.34 5.83 28.65 10.51 9.53 6.06 5.71 5.43 4.81  
Nigeria 5.10 7.66 9.29 0.34 16.89 0.39 16.31 15.38 11.62 10.48  
Angola 0.26 0.01 0.31 1.59 2.78 6.11 14.41 12.85 23.11 25.85  
Tanzania 4.26 4.77 2.56 0.22 3.01 26.85 3.76 2.92 3.01 2.84  
India 
 
Ethiopia       89.04 56.22 36.90 0.14 4.04 
Sudan      50.71  23.04    
SACU      0.57    4.45 46.75 
Mali      5.46  20.74  12.37  
Rwanda          14.71 3.76 
South Africa 
 
DRC      46.47 76.97 23.63 4.21   
Zimbabwe        2.91 63.83   
Liberia      53.53 1.91     
Guinea       1.35 50.12    
SACU         21.03   
(Cont’d.) 
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Table 4.4 (cont’d.) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Kuwait 
 
Sudan   61.86     25.34 28.01 38.07 8.02 
Ghana 9.68   79.51  0.55     3.15 
Guinea-Bissau    20.49        
Senegal   8.18  10.72 30.58 27.36 9.34 18.67  17.38 
Mauritania     24.15   9.03 19.23  16.15 
Saudi Arabia 
 
Djibouti   3.84 100.00        
Sudan   82.43      41.50 28.09  
Senegal      15.25  53.58    
Mali  56.96     21.58    20.55 
Mauritania     48.15    17.34 14.04 20.82 
UAE 
 
Sudan          4.81 45.93 
Seychelles          24.41 15.28 
Tanzania          31.62 6.07 
Eritrea          13.86 3.23 
Comoros          0.24 14.13 
Source: Compiled from OECD DAC and aiddata.org. 
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4.2.2 Sector concentration 
Regarding the sector concentration of trade, rising powers show different export patterns to 
SSA. Brazil tends to export mainly foodstuffs, while China’s main exports are machinery 
items. The main export sector of India and the Gulf states to SSA is mineral products. 
Overall, however, imports to SSA from the rising powers tend to be quite diversified, 
especially imports from South Africa, China and India. While some of these imports may 
compete with domestic sectors, they also provide valuable cheap inputs and machinery for 
SSA countries. 
On the other hand, exports from SSA to rising powers confirm the findings in the literature 
and are concentrated in natural resource sectors. Exports to Brazil and China are very 
concentrated in mineral products, with shares in this sector above 80 per cent on average for 
the period. Exports to India also concentrate mainly in the mineral products sector, but with 
an average share during the period of around 52 per cent. Exports to the Gulf states and 
Turkey are concentrated in metals for Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait, with around one-third 
of exports; and stones for the UAE and Turkey with also approximately one-third of all 
exports. Finally, exports to South Africa appear to be concentrated in two sectors, mineral 
products and stones, with an average of around 43 per cent and 24 per cent respectively. 
It is important to stress that this concentration of exports in these sectors is not only evident 
in the trading relationships with the rising powers but also with most OECD countries. 
However, as we will show below, concentration in less sophisticated commodities is more 
pronounced in rising powers. 
In the case of FDI, data for bilateral investments by sector is not available. However, the FT 
dataset compiles information about the number of projects to SSA by origin. Table 4.5 shows 
the percentage of projects for each rising power in the top investment sectors. One must be 
cautious when interpreting the numbers, since projects can have very different sizes and 
therefore the number may not capture accurately the significance of the projects. 
In general, the data suggest a significantly diversified investment portfolio for the rising 
powers, especially for India and South Africa. India combines investment in services 
(financial, communications and IT) with investments in the extractive industry. The Gulf 
states have concentrated their investment projects mainly in services including real estate 
and tourism. In Brazil, almost half of the projects concentrate in natural resources, while 
China shows a more diversified portfolio, with a larger number of projects in the 
communications sector followed by metals and the automotive sector. 
Finally, regarding the concentration of aid flows across DAC sectors, our dataset suggests 
significant differences in the sector composition of aid flows.2 While in specific years aid flows 
may be heavily allocated in specific sectors, these may change from one year to the other. In 
general, we observe that South Africa’s aid concentrates in the government and civil society 
sector, as well as agriculture. Brazil’s aid is mainly concentrated in the education sector; 
India’s in the energy generation sector; Kuwait’s on transport and storage; Saudi Arabia’s on 
transport and storage and water and sanitation sectors; and the UAE has focused mainly on 
budget support and other multi-sector initiatives. 
Sector concentration, therefore, appears very large on imports from SSA, but less so on 
exports. FDI flows appear quite diversified when looking at the number of projects, and aid 
flows are concentrated in specific sectors, which are different across rising powers. 
                                               
2
 We exclude China due to the lack of data on the sector allocation of aid. 
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Table 4.5 Percentage of investments projects by sector, 2003–2011 
Country Sector (%)  Country Sector (%) 
India Financial services 17.32 Saudi Arabia Communications 35.29 
Automotive OEM 9.09 Food and tobacco 23.53 
Software and IT services 8.66 Financial services 17.65 
Coal, oil and natural gas 6.93 Real estate 11.76 
Communications 5.63 Beverages 5.88 
South Africa Financial services 22.97 Kuwait Communications 53.33 
Communications 12.44 Hotels and tourism 20.00 
Food and tobacco 10.53 Financial services 13.33 
Metals 8.13 Real estate 6.67 
Chemicals 5.26 Software and IT services 6.67 
China Communications 19.09 Qatar Communications 26.67 
Metals 15.45 Financial services 26.67 
Automotive OEM 13.64 Real estate 20.00 
Coal, oil and natural gas 11.82 Hotels and tourism 6.67 
Building and construction 
materials 
7.27 Coal, oil and natural gas 6.67 
UAE Transportation 16.67 Turkey Metals 20.00 
Hotels and tourism 16.67 Consumer products 20.00 
Financial services 12.82 Textiles 20.00 
Real estate 7.69 Real estate 10.00 
Business services 7.69 Transportation 10.00 
Brazil Coal, oil and natural gas 31.03  
Metals 17.24 
Automotive OEM 13.79 
Chemicals 10.34 
Building and construction  6.90 
Source: Elaborated from FT dataset. 
4.2.3 Concentration of aid flows according to country characteristics 
In order to further understand the concentration of rising power economic flows in SSA 
countries, we look at the allocation of aid flows3 across different country characteristics, 
which have been suggested as important by aid allocation literature. This allows us to better 
understand some of the motivations behind rising powers’ aid allocation. 
Appendix 1 shows the plot of concentration curves for seven rising powers, excluding Turkey 
due to lack of aid data, and six different types of characteristics. The first and second figures 
in each column represents commercial interest in aid allocation, given by the degree of 
exports to a particular SSA country (first figure) and imports from each SSA country (third 
figure). The figures should be interpreted as the cumulative amount of aid flows ranked by 
the size of exports (imports). This is similar to a Lorenz curve and represents the amount of 
aid flows that concentrate in countries with more or fewer trade relationships. For example, if 
the concentration curve resembles the 45 degrees line, this suggests that aid is allocated to 
                                               
3
 The lack of complete data on bilateral FDI flows implies that we could not reproduce this analysis for FDI flows. 
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all countries in similar ways independent of whether they are large or small export (import) 
destinations (origin) for rising powers. On the other hand, the closer the curve is to the flat 
lower horizontal axis, the more aid is concentrated in countries with strong trade 
relationships; and the closer to the top horizontal line, the more aid is disbursed to countries 
with little trade relationship. 
The third figure in each column shows the concentration across levels of income per capita, 
to capture the importance of relative income levels in the allocation of aid by rising powers. 
The fourth figure uses the variable natural resources depletion4 as a percentage of gross 
national income calculated by the World Bank to capture the concentration of aid flows 
across countries with more or less natural resource exploitation. The fifth figure shows 
concentration of aid allocation across different levels of transparency and corruption of the 
public sector. For this, we use the World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 
(CPIA) on transparency, accountability and corruption in the public sector index, which 
ranges from 1, low transparency and accountability, to 6, highly transparent and accountable 
public sector. These figures aim to capture the extent to which aid concentrates in countries 
with more or less governance problems in the public sector. 
Finally, the last figure attempts to consider how allocation varies according to level of political 
affinity. To this end we use the index developed by Strezhnev and Voeten (2013) of affinity in 
UN voting. This index ranges between -1, no affinity, and 1, equal voting.5 
Before starting with the analysis of the figures it is important to emphasise that the 
concentration curves do not imply causality or any attempt to measure the importance of 
each of these country characteristics on the aid allocation rule. Other elements may play a 
more important role in determining the allocation rule. The figures, however, do show the 
resultant allocation of flows and the final configuration across different country 
characteristics. 
Starting with commercial interests, several authors have characterised India’s and China’s 
economic cooperation in SSA as market seeking. Looking at the concentration of aid flows 
according to importance as export destination shows that for all countries except South 
Africa aid allocation is slightly biased towards countries with larger export shares. However, 
this is more pronounced for Brazil and the UAE, which allocate the most aid to selected 
important export destinations. In the case of Brazil a significant amount of aid flows are 
concentrated in one of the most important exports markets, Angola. Finally, Saudi Arabia 
shows an even distribution of aid allocation across countries with different degrees of export 
relationships, while for Kuwait there is larger concentration especially in one country that is a 
significant export market. 
The curves ranking concentration across sources of imports show a similar pattern to that for 
exports. It is possible that countries target aid flows to support countries that have key import 
sectors. While there is higher concentration in countries with larger import shares, this 
appears to be relatively large mainly for Brazil and the UAE. 
Therefore, in terms of economic interests, the results show that while allocation tends to be 
more concentrated in countries with more intense trade relationships, this concentration is 
not especially large. More importantly, aid flows from some OECD countries show a similar 
pattern of concentration to some rising powers. For example, the UK shows a very similar 
concentration pattern to China’s (see Appendix 2 for selected OECD countries). 
                                               
4
 Natural resource depletion is the sum of net forest depletion, energy depletion, and mineral depletion according to the World 
Development Indicators database for 2012. 
5
 It is calculated as 1 –2*(d)/dmax, where d is the sum of metric distances between votes by country pairs in a given year and 
dmax is the largest possible metric distance for those votes (Strezhnev and Voeten 2013). Each vote is quantified with 1 = ‘yes’ 
or approval; 2 = abstain, 3 = ‘no’ or disapproval. 
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Regarding the extent to which countries allocate flows to poorer countries in SSA (second 
figures), the allocation appears to be quite neutral across income levels for China, India, 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. For South Africa, the allocation of flows appears to be progressive 
in the sense that most flows are allocated to poorer countries. On the other hand, in Brazil 
and the UAE flows are concentrated in a pair of countries with income around the median 
income per capita in SSA. Again the results are not so different from the allocation pattern of 
OECD countries, which for most countries do not appear to be progressive; and China’s 
country allocation is similar to that for the UK, the USA or Denmark. 
The fourth figure in each column focuses on the concentration in countries with greater 
exploitation of natural resources. In general, the allocation of aid flows is larger in countries 
with greater natural resource exploitation. This bias is very large in South Africa and the 
UAE, substantial in China, moderate in India and less so in Kuwait. For South Africa and the 
UAE, aid flows are concentrated heavily in a country with natural resource exploitation in the 
75th percentile, while for Brazil these are concentrated in a country around the median. The 
figures in Appendix 2 suggest that aid allocation in rising powers may be allocated more to 
countries with natural resources than in some of the main OECD countries. 
Regarding transparency and corruption, China, India, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia’s allocations 
appear to be quite neutral across different levels of governance (similar to the USA in 
Appendix 2). However, while South Africa and the UAE concentrate aid flows in countries 
with low transparency and accountability of the public sector, Brazil allocates aid flows mainly 
to a country in the 75th percentile. 
Finally, regarding UN voting affinity, most rising powers appear to be quite neutral in aid 
allocation and when there is concentration in a specific country, they do not appear to have a 
very high affinity in voting. The exceptions are Brazil and Kuwait with large concentration in 
countries with some affinity. Comparisons with OECD countries in Appendix 2 show that 
allocation in OECD countries is more concentrated in countries with less political affinity, 
although China and the USA appear very similar. 
In general, the results show significant heterogeneity in aid allocation across rising powers. 
For Brazil, South Africa and the UAE the pattern of concentration is explained by the large 
concentration of flows in a very narrow number of countries. More importantly, these 
allocations, especially for China and India, do not appear very different from those of OECD 
countries. Perhaps the areas where there is more difference in concentration between main 
OECD countries and rising powers are concentration in countries with more natural 
resources and more political affinity. 
4.3 Similarity of flows 
One of the most important hypotheses about South–South cooperation is the claim of a 
‘differentiated’ approach to economic cooperation. While this ‘differentiated’ approach can be 
translated into many different types of economic engagement, one important question in 
terms of the footprint is whether it is translated into significant differences in the allocation of 
flows across countries and sectors. This might indicate whether any expected ‘differentiated’ 
development impact may arise from different sector or country allocation. In order to make 
comparisons meaningful, however, we also need to include traditional OECD donors in the 
analysis and identify how similar the rising powers are to OECD countries. 
As a similarity indicator, we use the Finger-Kreinin (FK) index. This index is used in trade 
analysis to compare similarity of flows between two countries or one country with different 
destinations. The index is bounded between 0, totally different, and 1, totally identical sector 
or country allocation (see Box 4.1). 
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We start by looking at the similarity between countries for each type of flow individually. 
Tables A3.1 to A3.7 in Appendix 3 show the similarity matrices. Table A3.1 shows the 
similarity for HS-2 chapters (sectors) of imports in rising powers and selected OECD 
countries originated in SSA. The measure computes the degree of similarity in sector imports 
from SSA. Table A3.2 reports the same matrix for similarity of HS-2 chapter exports to SSA. 
Tables A3.3 and A3.4 focus on similarity of destinations for exports and import origins of 
rising powers and OECD countries. Table A3.5 reports the similarity matrix for country 
allocation of aid flows, while Table A3.6 shows the similarity of OECD DAC-3 digits sector. 
Finally, Table A3.7 shows the similarity matrix for the sector composition of FDI projects. 
Box 4.1 Finger-Kreinin index 
The Finger Kreinin index is defined as: 
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The index is bounded between 0 and 1, with 0 indicating that the country or sector allocation of 
flows of country i and j in SSA are totally different; and 1 indicating that the pattern of allocation 
between the countries is identical. The intuition of the index is that it compares for two countries the 
similarity of country or sector shares in their allocations. For example, in the case of two countries 
where the sector share allocation is identical, the index will take the sum of the shares for one or the 
other and it will add up to 1. On the other hand, if the countries’ allocation is totally different, for 
each sector or country the minimum value will be 0, since at least one country will not allocate in the 
same sector. 
 
On average, the type of flow that tends to be more similar among rising powers and OECD 
countries is the country allocation of exports to SSA. On the other hand, there is less 
similarity in the sector composition of FDI and sector and country aid allocation. 
There is considerable heterogeneity of Finger-Kreinin indices within rising powers, within 
OECD countries and also between rising powers and OECD countries. In addition, this 
heterogeneity is present when looking across different types of flows. Regarding rising 
powers, the similarity matrices indicate that: 
 Similarity in sector imports from SSA: Brazil appears highly similar to China, 
and even more similar to the USA, while China is also very similar to the USA. 
South Africa is similar to Japan, while the Gulf states appear dissimilar to each 
other. 
 Similarity in sector exports to SSA: Brazil appears more similar to South 
Africa, and China to India and the UK, although the index is not high. On the 
other hand, sector exports to SSA are similar between India and South Africa 
and between India and Turkey. Again, the Gulf states appear quite dissimilar 
in sector trade. 
 Similarity in SSA exports destinations: Brazil is similar to the USA, China and 
the UK, while China is also similar to Canada, India, the USA and the UK. 
India appears similar to the UK and China; Turkey to Canada and China; and 
the Gulf states appear more similar among themselves. 
 Similarity in imports origins from SSA: Brazil is similar to the USA and India, 
and China relatively similar to the USA, France and Korea. India is similar to 
the USA; Turkey to the UK, Norway and Qatar; and South Africa appears very 
different from other countries regarding import origins from SSA. 
Summing up, the results for trade flows show relatively high similarity indices. There is 
significantly high similarity between rising powers, especially China, Brazil and India. 
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However, these countries tend to have high similarity of trade structures with other OECD 
countries, especially the USA. 
Regarding the similarity of aid allocation for both sectors and countries, the similarity 
matrices in A3.5 and A3.6 show much lower degree of similarity across countries than for 
trade flows, suggesting that aid allocation is more heterogeneous than trade patterns. 
Most rising powers have different patterns in country targeting of aid. Brazil, India, South 
Africa and the Gulf states show low Finger-Kreinin indices with other rising powers and also 
with OECD countries. China is the country which shows more similarity, especially with 
Canada, the USA, the UK, Germany and Japan, although this is only around 0.43. A similar 
pattern of heterogeneity emerges in relation to DAC-3 digits sector allocation. Brazil’s aid 
sector allocation is closer to Korea, India’s is similar to the UAE, and the Gulf states are more 
similar to each other. However, most of these similarity indices are low and around 0.3–0.4. 
South Africa’s sector aid allocation appears very different from other countries. 
The last matrix A3.7 shows the similarity in relation to the number of FDI projects in SSA by 
sector for the period 2003–2011. The Finger-Kreinin indices are also lower than for trade 
flows, and lower on average than for aid flows. However, some of the similarity indices of 
rising powers appear to be relatively high: Brazil and China invest in similar sectors, as do 
China and France; India and South Africa, US and UK; and South Africa and the UK. On the 
other hand, Turkey appears to invest in different sectors from all others, while the Gulf states 
show similar sector investment patterns. 
Therefore, regarding the similarity of aid flows of rising powers, we find that countries tend to 
be relatively different in both their sector and country aid allocations. In the case of FDI 
projects by sector, the data suggest some similarities between some of the rising powers, 
particularly Brazil, India and China (the BICs), and between some of the BICs and some 
OECD countries. 
In addition to describing the most similar partners for rising powers, it is important to identify 
unusually similar or dissimilar country pairs. In order to do so, for each flow we identify the 
country pairs that have on average for the period a very low Finger-Kreinin index, defined as 
a value below the 10th percentile of the distribution, ‘highly dissimilar’; and very high indices, 
defined as values above the 90th percentile, ‘highly similar’. 
Table 4.6 lists the country pairs, each including at least one rising power, that are highly 
similar or highly dissimilar. Panel (a) focuses on sector similarity of imports from SSA, while 
panel (b) focuses on sector similarity of exports to SSA. Table 4.7 shows the same 
information for country exports and imports. Finally, Table 4.8 shows the information for aid 
and FDI flows. One interesting element of Table 4.8 is that in panel (a) we cannot find any 
country pairs, including a rising power, that are highly similar – either in sector or country 
allocation. 
Country pairs highlighted in red show those pairs with high similarity and dissimilarity where 
both countries are rising powers. In terms of imports from SSA, Brazil and China, and China 
and India show high similarity of sector imports, while India and the Southern African 
Customs Union (SACU), and Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are very similar on sector exports to 
SSA. 
When looking at export destinations in SSA, rising powers do not have highly similar or 
dissimilar partners with the exception of SACU and Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, import 
sources tend to be highly dissimilar between Gulf states and other rising powers and 
between SACU and other rising powers. 
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Table 4.6 Similarity and dissimilarity of trade flows by HS-2 chapter 
Imports from SSA (a) Exports to SSA (b) 
HS-2 chapter dissimilar HS-2 chapter similar HS-2 chapter dissimilar HS-2 chapter similar 
Brazil Czech Rep. Brazil China Austria Kuwait Belgium-
Luxembourg 
India 
Brazil Finland Brazil Portugal Austria Qatar Belgium-
Luxembourg 
SACU 
Brazil Hungary Brazil Spain Austria Saudi Arabia France SACU 
Brazil Kuwait Brazil USA Canada Kuwait India SACU 
Brazil Norway Canada China Canada Qatar Italy SACU 
Brazil Poland Canada India Canada Saudi Arabia Kuwait Saudi 
Arabia 
Brazil Qatar China India China Kuwait Portugal SACU 
Brazil Slovakia China Portugal China Qatar SACU Spain 
China Czech Rep. China Rep. of Korea Czech Rep. Kuwait SACU UK 
China Hungary China Spain Czech Rep. Qatar   
China Kuwait China USA Czech Rep. Saudi Arabia   
China Poland India USA Denmark Kuwait   
China Qatar Italy SACU Denmark Qatar   
China Slovakia Japan SACU Finland Kuwait   
    Finland Qatar   
    Finland Saudi Arabia   
    France Kuwait   
    France Qatar   
    Germany Kuwait   
    Germany Qatar   
    Hungary Kuwait   
    Hungary Qatar   
    Hungary Saudi Arabia   
    Iceland Kuwait   
    Iceland Qatar   
    Iceland Saudi Arabia   
    Ireland Kuwait   
    Ireland Qatar   
    Ireland Saudi Arabia   
    Italy Kuwait   
    Italy Qatar   
    Japan Kuwait   
    Japan Qatar   
    Japan Saudi Arabia   
    Kuwait Mexico   
    Kuwait New Zealand   
    Kuwait Norway   
The list of country pairs excludes other combinations of Gulf states and OECD countries. Dissimilar if Finger-Kreinin average 
index below 10th percentile, similar if index above 90th percentile. 
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Table 4.7 Similarity and dissimilarity of trade flows by destination and 
origin 
Exports to SSA (a) Imports from SSA (b) 
Country dissimilar Country similar Country dissimilar
a
 Country similar 
Austria SACU China Italy Brazil Kuwait China Italy 
China Portugal China USA Brazil Qatar China USA 
Greece Kuwait China UK Brazil Saudi Arabia China UK 
Hungary SACU Italy Turkey Brazil UAE Germany Turkey 
Iceland Kuwait   China SACU Kuwait Qatar 
Iceland Qatar   Kuwait SACU Norway Turkey 
Iceland Saudi Arabia   Qatar SACU Qatar UK 
Iceland SACU   Saudi Arabia SACU Turkey UK 
India Portugal   SACU Turkey   
Kuwait Norway   SACU UAE   
Kuwait Portugal   Australia Brazil   
Kuwait Rep. of Korea   Australia China   
Mexico SACU   Australia SACU   
Poland SACU   Brazil Czech Rep.   
Portugal Qatar   Brazil Denmark   
Portugal Saudi Arabia   Brazil Finland   
Portugal SACU   Brazil Hungary   
Portugal Turkey   Brazil Iceland   
Portugal UAE   Brazil Ireland   
Rep. of Korea SACU   Brazil Norway   
Saudi Arabia SACU   Brazil Poland   
    Brazil Slovakia   
    Brazil UK   
    China Hungary   
    China Iceland   
    China New Zealand   
    China Slovakia   
    Czech Rep. SACU   
    Denmark SACU   
    Finland SACU   
    France Kuwait   
    France Qatar   
    France Saudi Arabia   
    Hungary SACU   
    Iceland SACU   
    Ireland SACU   
    Japan SACU   
    Norway SACU   
Note: 
a
The list of country pairs is incomplete and excludes other combinations. Dissimilar if Finger-Kreinin average index below 
10th percentile, similar if index above 90th percentile. 
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Table 4.8 panel (a) emphasises that in terms of aid flows rising powers do not tend to be 
highly similar or dissimilar to other countries, with the exception of Brazil and the Gulf states. 
In relation to FDI sector allocation, however, we find high similarity between the Gulf states 
States, Brazil and China, and India and SACU. 
Table 4.8 Aid and FDI flows similarity pairs 
Aid to SSA (a) FDI in SSA (b) 
Country dissimilarity Aid sector dissimilarity 
FDI sector 
dissimilarity FDI sector similarity 
Australia Qatar Greece Kuwait Australia Kuwait Australia Canada 
Brazil South Africa Kuwait 
New 
Zealand Australia 
Saudi 
Arabia Brazil China 
Brazil UAE Kuwait Sweden Brazil Denmark China France 
Denmark Qatar 
New 
Zealand 
South 
Africa Brazil Kuwait France India 
Kuwait Portugal 
Saudi 
Arabia USA Brazil 
Saudi 
Arabia Germany India 
Norway Qatar   Canada Kuwait India South Africa 
Portugal Saudi Arabia   Canada 
Saudi 
Arabia India USA 
Portugal South Africa   China 
New 
Zealand India UK 
Portugal UAE   India 
New 
Zealand Kuwait Qatar 
Qatar Sweden   Kuwait Turkey Kuwait Saudi Arabia 
Qatar Switzerland   
New 
Zealand 
South 
Africa Qatar Saudi Arabia 
Qatar UK     Qatar South Africa 
Saudi 
Arabia South Africa     
South 
Africa UAE 
      
South 
Africa UK 
      UAE UK 
Note: Dissimilar if Finger-Kreinin average index below 10th percentile, similar if index above 90th percentile. 
Overall the results when looking at individual economic flows suggest: 
 High similarity among rising powers, mainly Brazil, China and India; and this 
occurs mainly on sector trade and investment. 
 However, for these flows there is also high similarity between rising powers 
and some OECD countries. 
 South Africa appears quite different from other rising powers for some flows. 
The same applies to Turkey for flows with data available. 
 Gulf states also appear different from other rising powers and similar to each 
other. 
To further analyse the issue of similarity, we compare similarity across all types of flows. 
Specifically, we look at country pairs where Finger-Kreinin indices for all flows are above the 
75th percentile (highly similar across economic flows) and below the 25th percentile (highly 
dissimilar across economic flows). We cluster observations for country allocations and 
separately for sectors. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 illustrate graphically the clustering exercise for 
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rising power similarities. In each quadrant is represented the scatter plot of similarities 
indices between country pairs in terms of sector/country composition. In each quadrant we 
search for country pairs with similarities indices that are concentrated in the top right-hand 
corner, for all types of flow combinations. For example, country pairs that are very similar in 
the sector allocation of aid, FDI, exports and imports. 
Figure 4.4 Scatter plot rising powers’ similarity indices for 2010: sector 
allocation 
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Figure 4.5 Scatter plot rising powers’ similarity indices for 2010: country 
allocation 
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In terms of country allocation, similarity – considering aid, export and imports, since FDI 
bilateral countries’ shares are not available – the main outcome is that mainly some OECD 
countries can be clustered in these three dimensions in the highly similar group. On the other 
hand, highly dissimilar clustering shows that the Gulf states and South Africa tend to be very 
different from other rising powers and OECD countries. 
The sector clustering shows that very few countries can be clustered along the four 
dimensions of export, imports, FDI and aid as highly similar or dissimilar. Only three dyads of 
OECD countries are clustered as highly similar;6 while Brazil and Kuwait and Brazil and 
Saudi Arabia are the only dissimilar country pairs. Given that China cannot be clustered due 
to lack of aid sector allocation, we reproduce the exercise but exclude from the clustering aid 
sector allocation. Therefore, this new clustering exercise compares similarity in terms of 
sector trade flows, exports and imports, and FDI flows by sector. In this case, the results 
show a larger number of country pairs that are highly similar,7 including China and India, 
India and South Africa and China and South Africa. 
These results reinforce the following findings: 
 Aid allocation introduces significant differences across rising powers, across 
OECD countries and between rising powers and OECD countries. 
 Sector allocation clustering indicates significant similarities between some 
rising powers, mainly China, India and South Africa. However, this similarity 
also exists between these rising powers and some OECD countries, 
especially the USA. 
 Country allocation clustering does not suggest large similarity across rising 
powers. 
Overall, the data does not suggest that South–South cooperation is necessarily translated 
into a cluster of similar sector and country allocation of economic flows for all rising powers. 
As expected, divergences in objectives translate in different engagement patterns, some of 
which are similar to those of OECD countries. 
Based on the data analysis in this section, Table 4.9 attempts to summarise the country 
profile for each rising power’s economic engagement footprint. 
 
                                               
6
 Germany with Japan, Germany with UK and Germany with France. 
7
 Concretely the highly similar dyads for trade and FDI are: China and France; China and India; China and South Africa; France 
and Germany; France and India; France and South Africa; France and the USA; France and the UK; Germany and Japan; 
Germany and South Africa; Germany and the UK; India and South Africa; India and the USA; South Africa and the USA; South 
Africa and the UAE; and South Africa and the UK. 
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Table 4.9 Summary of economic engagement footprint 
 Brazil China India South Africa Turkey Gulf states 
General profile Resource-seeker 
(commodities), 
Lusophone 
concentration and 
focus on technical 
cooperation 
assistance 
Main trade partner for 
SSA. 
Resource-seeker and 
market-seeker. 
Important investor and 
diversified portfolio, 
increasingly important 
donor 
Very important 
partner for SSA. 
Resource-seeker 
and market-seeker. 
Very important 
investor and 
diversified portfolio 
in services. 
Increasing aid 
donor, especially in 
energy generation 
Important trade partner 
and investor for the region 
given its location. 
Resource-seeker and 
market-seeker. Aid and 
investment relations 
mainly with neighbours, 
although aid also for 
security and peacekeeper 
Marginal 
economic partner 
for the region 
Increasingly important 
trade, investor and aid 
partner. Resource-seeker 
(land and water) 
Economic 
engagement and 
allocation of flows 
Net importer. 
Access to natural 
resources, political 
alignment, mainly 
with Lusophone 
countries. 
Investments 
directed by a few 
multinational 
corporations. 
Aid takes the 
forms of 
knowledge 
sharing, skills 
transfer, technical 
assistance for 
social programmes 
Net exporter. 
Access to natural 
resources and export 
markets, business 
opportunities in Africa 
for Chinese companies, 
acceptance of the One-
China policy, reducing 
production and 
transport costs via 
infrastructure 
development. 
Allocations appear 
similar to other OECD 
countries regarding 
recipients governance, 
trade interests, levels of 
income per capita or 
natural resources 
Net importer. 
Access to resources 
and to markets. 
Interest in energy 
sector 
Avoidance of being 
perceived to 
operate like 
Chinese business. 
Allocation of aid 
flows in SSA also 
similar to other 
OECD countries in 
terms of recipient 
characteristics. 
Important services 
investor 
Net exporter. Political 
influence through the 
African Renaissance Fund 
(ARF) and conflict 
prevention, peacekeeping, 
resolution, mediation, 
post-conflict 
reconstruction. 
Different aid allocations to 
other rising powers and 
OECD countries 
Net importer. 
Marginal partner 
for SSA 
Net exporter. Increasingly 
important partners in 
investment and aid. 
Important services 
investors 
(Cont’d.) 
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Table 4.9 (cont’d.) 
 Brazil China India South Africa Turkey Gulf states 
Trade Size 16th import origin and 
14th export 
destination in 2010 
Main trade partner for SSA Fifth import origin and 
third export destination 
Fourth main import origin and 
export destination in 2010 
Marginal trade 
partner 30th import 
origin and 29th 
export destination in 
2010 
UAE and Saudi Arabia more 
important as import origin 
(13th and 15th in 2010), 
marginal export destinations 
(25th and 32nd) 
Sector 
concentration 
Imports from Brazil 
foodstuffs 
Exports from SSA 
mineral products (85–
90%) 
Imports from China 
machinery/electrical 
Exports from SSA mineral 
products (75–80%) 
Imports from India 
mineral products 
Exports from SSA 
mineral products (65–
70%) 
Diversified imports from South 
Africa 
Exports from South Africa 
mineral products and 
stone/glass 
Imports from Turkey 
concentrated in 
metals 
Exports from SSA 
stone/glass (35%) 
Imports from Gulf states 
concentrated in mineral 
products (45–70%) 
Exports from SSA metals and 
stone/glass 
Country 
concentration 
Imports from Brazil 
SACU 27.96%, 
Nigeria 26.20% 
Exports from SSA 
Nigeria 72.37% 
Imports from China SACU 
30.45%, Nigeria 17.38% 
Exports from SSA Angola 
32.56%, Sudan 20.97% 
Imports from India 
SACU 18.65%, Nigeria 
15.09% 
Exports from SSA 
Angola 39.76%, Benin 
36.13% 
Imports from South Africa 
Zimbabwe 17.49%, Zambia 
14.06%, Mozambique 11.66% 
Exports from SSA Nigeria 
24.07%, Zimbabwe 20.21%, 
Angola 9.67% 
Imports from Turkey 
largely concentrated 
from SACU, Sudan 
and Nigeria 
Exports from SSA 
mainly from SACU 
Imports from Gulf states 
diversified – SACU, Kenya, 
Sudan etc. 
Exports from SSA mainly from 
SACU, but also Benin for 
Saudi Arabia 
Similarities 
(sector) 
Exports from SSA: 
China, Spain, Portugal 
Exports from SSA: Brazil, 
India, Portugal, USA etc. 
Exports from SSA: 
China, USA etc. 
Imports: South Africa, 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Exports from SSA: Italy, Japan 
Imports: Portugal, Spain, UK 
 Exports from SSA: other Gulf 
states 
Similarities 
(country) 
 Imports from China: Italy, 
US and UK 
Exports from SSA: Italy, US 
and UK 
  Imports from Turkey: 
Italy, 
Exports from SSA: 
UK and Germany 
Exports from SSA: Qatar and 
Kuwait 
Dissimilarities 
(sector) 
Exports from SSA: 
Kuwait, Norway etc. 
    Exports from SSA: Brazil, 
China etc. 
Imports: China and other 
OECD etc. 
Dissimilarities 
(country) 
Exports from SSA: 
Gulf states and other 
OECD 
Exports from SSA: South 
Africa and other OECD 
Imports from India: 
Portugal 
Imports from South Africa: 
India, Gulf states and other 
OECD 
Exports from SSA, China, 
Turkey, Gulf states and other 
OECD 
Imports from Turkey: 
Portugal 
Exports from SSA- 
South Africa 
Imports from Gulf states: 
SACU and other OECD 
countries 
Exports from SSA- South 
Africa and other OECD 
(Cont’d.) 
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Table 4.9 (cont’d.) 
 Brazil China India South Africa Turkey Gulf states 
FDI Size 11th investor (2003–
11) 
6th investor (2003–11) 4th investor (2003–11) 8th investor (2003–11) Marginal investor in 
SSA 
UAE 9th investor (2003–
11) 
Sector 
concentration 
Main sectors 
(projects): coal, oil and 
natural gas 
Main sectors (projects): 
communications, metals, 
automotive 
Main sectors (projects): 
financial services 
Main sectors (projects): 
financial services 
Main sectors 
(projects): metals, 
clothing 
Main sectors (projects): 
transportation, 
communications, tourism 
and financial services 
Country 
concentration 
Angola South Africa, Nigeria and 
Zambia 
    
Similarities 
(sector) 
China Brazil and France South Africa, USA, UK, 
France, Germany 
India, Qatar, UAE, UK  Among Gulf states, UAE 
with UK 
Dissimilarities 
(sector) 
Denmark and Kuwait  New Zealand New Zealand Kuwait Brazil, Australia and 
Canada 
Aid Size Marginal Estimated 4th donor in 
2009 and 10th donor for 
period 2000–10. 
Increasing importance 
19th donor for period 
2000–10. 
Increasing importance 
Marginal Negligible Kuwait, UAE and Saudi 
Arabia together 17th 
donor. Increasing 
importance 
Sector 
concentration 
Education  Energy generation Government and civil 
society, general 
 Transport and storage; 
water and sanitation 
Country 
concentration 
Mozambique and 
other Lusophone 
countries 
Angola, Nigeria, Sudan Ethiopia, Sudan, SACU 
Mali 
DRC, Zimbabwe, Liberia, 
Guinea 
Other SACU 
 Sudan and others 
Similarities       
Dissimilarities 
(sector) 
   New Zealand  Greece, New Zealand and 
USA 
Dissimilarities 
(country) 
South Africa, UAE   Brazil, Portugal, Gulf 
states 
 Portugal and South Africa 
 
 
 32 
4.4 Development footprint impacts 
From the perspective of SSA countries, the most important element in relation to rising 
powers’ economic engagement is its developmental impact. The analysis above suggests 
that: (i) rising powers are becoming important countries for SSA, especially regarding trade 
and investment; and (ii) rising powers are not a homogenous group and in some cases are 
not so different from traditional OECD donors. Whether they are likely to have similar or 
differentiated development impacts is uncertain. However, their increasing importance as 
economic partners for SSA implies that any development impact is likely to be increasing 
over time. 
Understanding the development footprint of rising powers’ engagement in SSA ultimately 
depends on the micro impact of these engagements, mainly on firms and households. In this 
section, we analyse four trade and investment elements that can be measured in our dataset 
and are associated with enhanced/reduced economic and development impacts. These are: 
the volatility of flows, the contribution to export diversification, integration in value chains and 
the sophistication and technological intensity of exports from SSA. 
4.4.1 Volatility of flows 
High volatility of economic flows is bad for economic development since it increases 
economic uncertainty. In the case of trade flows, volatility matters mainly for exports, since 
changes in import values may reflect only reallocation of import sources. We start by 
calculating the standard deviation of exports for each of the rising power destinations and 
compare it with that of exports to OECD countries. However, given the very large increase in 
exports to rising powers experienced during the period, this measure can be misleading. This 
is observed in the data, where the standard deviation of exports, normalised by the mean, is 
larger in rising powers than OECD countries, especially in countries with the largest export 
increases such as China, India and Brazil. The standard deviation, however, falls 
considerably when the exports series is de-trended. 
One natural experiment when looking at the potential contribution of rising powers in 
reducing volatility for exports is to analyse the role of trade with rising powers during the 
world trade collapse in 2009. While the crisis was mainly experienced in OECD countries, it 
is critical to understand the role of rising powers in balancing the reduction of exports to 
these markets. To this end, we calculate the change in exports from 2008 to 2009. Given that 
the economic recession was mainly experienced in OECD countries, the results are 
somewhat surprising. Exports to China and India also fell significantly, by 29.46 per cent and 
16.6 per cent, though not as much as the average reduction in OECD countries of 39 per 
cent.8 Exports to Brazil decreased by 44.4 per cent and to South Africa by 40 per cent, since 
these countries also experienced a recession. Exports to Turkey were reduced by 16.9 per 
cent. Therefore, while export performance to rising powers was better than to OECD 
countries, it was still negative and not good enough to positively offset any export reductions 
in OECD markets. 
Regarding investment, it is very difficult to measure FDI volatility since bilateral FDI flows 
tend to change substantially from year to year given that investments projects occur mainly in 
one period. As a result, we focus on aid flows volatility. The average volatility for rising 
powers for the period 2000–2010, as captured by the standard deviation over the mean, is 
0.95, while for OECD countries it is 0.62. This large volatility of aid flows in rising powers is, 
however, difficult to interpret for two main reasons. First, the possibility that data for Brazil, 
South Africa and some of the Gulf states are incomplete, increasing the noise in the data. 
                                               
8
 While most of the reduction corresponds to a reduction in oil and mineral exports, other sectors such as agriculture, chemicals 
or wood products also experience significant reductions in exports from SSA to China and India. 
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Second, the fact that China has substantially increased aid flows during the period and the 
measure is capturing a positive trend. 
The results suggest, therefore, that rising powers have contributed to reducing the volatility of 
trade flows, although less than expected. In relation to aid volatility, this appears large, but it 
is difficult to determine how robust this result is, given the gaps in the data. In general, 
however, it is important to stress the positive trend in these flows. 
4.4.2 Export diversification 
The importance of export diversification for economic growth and development is almost 
uncontroversial nowadays. For example, Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) show that countries 
diversify during the initial process of economic development. Diversification reduces risks 
and vulnerability with respect to external shocks and creates higher opportunities for 
investments in profitable activities, learning and externalities. Therefore, one additional 
benefit of trade engagement from rising powers in SSA is the potential contribution to export 
diversification in the region. 
The previous section showed a high dependence of SSA exports in primary commodity 
sectors. However, it is important to understand whether the increase in exports has been 
translated into diversification into new products. 
Table 4.10 shows the number of products exported for each year. In order to avoid the 
adjustment of the trade collapse in 2009, the last column calculates the change in exported 
products from 2000 to 2008. The number of products exported to China, India and the UAE 
experienced a substantial increase, especially for the former, given the large export base in 
terms of products already existing in 2000. On the other hand, export diversification to Brazil 
and Turkey was extremely modest, and exports to Saudi Arabia and South Africa 
experienced increased concentration in fewer products exported. 
This indicates that mainly China, India and the UAE have played a positive role in export 
diversification in the SSA region. 
Table 4.10 Numbers of products exported by year 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Change 
2000–2008 
Brazil 783 742 714 792 726 739 800 778 837 766 862 6.90% 
China 1,220 1,215 1,357 1,482 1,210 1,391 1,414 1,616 1,677 1,520 1,688 37.46% 
India 1,410 1,282 1,447 1,521 1,464 1,541 1,580 1,540 1,663 1,560 1,781 17.94% 
Kuwait 538 209 240 296 229 242 223 765 701 261 227 30.30% 
Qatar 343 369 422 518 509 732 783 807 807 289 786 135.28% 
Saudi 
Arabia 1,127 1,210 1,320 1,578 1,175 1,227 1,241 1,210 793 678 741 –29.64% 
South 
Africa 2,926 2,518 2,648 2,443 2,086 2,195 2,278 2,363 2,286 2,183 2,161 –21.87% 
Turkey 755 744 681 766 694 709 792 808 838 809 912 10.99% 
UAE 1,640 1,251 1,443 1,558 1,339 1,925 1,573 2,153 2,201 1,506 1,580 34.21% 
Source: Own calculations from BACI. 
4.4.3 Value chain integration 
In comparison to other regions, such as Asia or Latin America, SSA has been largely 
excluded from participation in global value chains due to the sector composition of its 
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comparative advantage and the high trade costs in the region. Participation in production 
fragmentation and trade in tasks has become more important in the last two decades and 
tends to involve more value-added creation than primary commodity exports. As a result, a 
potential development benefit from rising powers’ economic engagement is to integrate SSA 
firms in value chains, and to participate in global production sharing. 
In terms of trade flows, the data shown in section 4.2 indicate that no intra-industry trade is 
occurring between SSA and the rising powers and that export flows in manufactured goods 
to rising powers are marginal. This suggests that the existing trade engagement is similar to 
the existing trade pattern with OECD countries, and that no significant participation in value 
chains should be expected in SSA as a result of trading with rising powers. 
Regarding FDI, however, investments from some rising powers, especially India and the Gulf 
states, appear more diversified that some OECD countries, and often focus on services. This 
could play an important role on increasing the competitiveness of SSA firms and facilitating 
future value chain integration. 
4.4.4 Sophistication and technological intensity of exports 
Increasing value added and productivity in SSA exports is critical for structural transformation 
in the region. As a result, it is important to analyse the concentration of bilateral exports 
across sectors with more or less sophistication and technological intensity. 
Table 4.11 shows the value of the SSA export basket to rising powers and OECD countries 
using the EXPY index, the weighted average of the PRODY sophistication index (see Box 
4.2) with export shares as weights (Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik 2007). 
Box 4.2 Measures of sophistication and technological intensity 
PRODY – we use the measure of sophistication introduced by Hausmann et al.(2007) and Lall, 
Weiss and Zhan (2006). Using the BACI dataset from CEPII that includes COMTRADE HS-6 trade 
data, we calculate for each product and year from 2001 to 2007, the measure defined in (3) below. 
This measure is a weighted average of the GDP per capita of the countries that export a specific 
product k, weighted by the respective export shares in relation to the sum of exports shares for that 
product and year. 
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Using the PRODY measure, one can calculate a measure of the sophistication of the export basket 
(EXPY) as a weighted average of PRODY using as weights the country’s export shares. 
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OECD classification for technological intensity (Hatzichronoglou 1999) – we use the technological 
content sophistication index from the OECD. This classification groups products according to the 
following rankings: (1) non-industrial products; (2) low technological intensity; (3) low/medium 
intensity; (4) medium/high intensity; and (5) high technological intensity. 
 
The results are quite striking: with the exception of some Gulf states such as Kuwait or 
Qatar, exports to rising powers have the lowest sophistication indices, and they are well 
below the average of the period of around $8,500. This is an indication that exports to rising 
powers are mimicking the already established export patterns of low sophistication existing 
with OECD countries, and at even lower sophistication levels. 
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Table 4.11 EXPY index exports from SSA (US$) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 
Iceland 17,238 10,307 11,348 17,609 10,410 18,316 16,907 14,052 15,233 17,497 10,959 14,534 
Sweden 12,629 11,996 13,000 13,878 14,521 12,191 12,650 13,310 12,879 11,043 11,330 12,675 
Ireland 10,853 10,720 10,384 12,162 12,415 10,699 10,657 12,648 13,197 10,630 11,694 11,460 
Denmark 11,853 11,445 11,299 12,986 10,971 9,836 10,843 11,576 12,706 11,149 10,818 11,408 
Hungary 8,439 8,650 10,709 11,044 12,459 12,567 12,973 11,730 11,219 10,306 10,092 10,926 
Finland 11,543 11,963 10,892 11,347 11,072 10,803 10,230 11,175 10,388 10,069 9,092 10,780 
Mexico 9,343 10,302 9,849 10,708 9,785 9,222 11,082 11,881 11,050 12,508 10,490 10,565 
Germany 9,984 9,955 10,602 10,759 11,897 10,735 10,489 11,428 10,651 8,999 9,774 10,480 
New Zealand 9,016 9,814 9,552 9,630 10,851 10,059 10,625 10,255 11,459 9,684 10,979 10,175 
Japan 8,783 8,493 8,210 10,219 9,424 10,113 10,091 11,325 10,915 10,622 10,318 9,865 
Austria 9,187 8,855 9,017 9,917 10,452 8,914 9,717 11,757 10,453 9,629 9,863 9,796 
Czech Rep. 7,728 7,746 9,114 9,212 10,685 9,523 10,674 10,442 10,768 9,782 10,364 9,640 
Australia 9,041 8,675 9,204 9,891 10,037 9,585 10,854 10,023 10,329 9,019 8,357 9,547 
Qatar 7,574 6,884 8,791 10,497 11,926 10,521 8,310 11,832 10,347 7,769 6,787 9,203 
Slovakia 6,858 6,151 6,809 7,172 12,109 9,806 9,174 10,243 11,175 10,600 9,780 9,080 
Rep. of Korea 8,566 8,160 8,263 12,865 7,904 8,931 9,831 8,996 8,863 7,517 8,399 8,936 
France 8,586 8,274 8,586 8,904 8,984 8,383 8,801 9,697 9,346 8,746 8,893 8,836 
Kuwait 6,717 7,561 8,687 8,497 14,489 7,260 9,266 6,768 7,747 6,167 6,110 8,115 
Norway 8,873 7,973 9,206 9,653 6,997 8,842 7,556 8,281 7,144 6,500 7,708 8,067 
Portugal 6,589 6,818 7,146 7,594 8,496 7,938 8,336 8,927 8,678 8,742 7,749 7,910 
Italy 7,131 7,247 7,328 7,851 8,607 7,525 7,855 8,718 8,412 7,976 8,098 7,886 
UK 6,737 7,258 6,764 7,722 8,020 7,459 7,720 8,641 9,252 7,841 8,335 7,795 
Poland 7,437 6,793 6,238 6,242 8,222 8,596 8,930 8,756 8,490 8,385 7,646 7,794 
Switzerland 6,395 7,141 7,238 8,422 8,861 8,881 7,453 8,255 6,777 9,800 6,478 7,791 
Netherlands 7,441 7,765 7,614 7,713 8,219 7,548 7,909 8,338 8,053 7,042 7,193 7,712 
Spain 6,592 6,841 7,067 7,915 7,840 7,858 8,359 8,276 8,506 7,431 7,287 7,634 
USA 7,261 7,372 7,668 7,371 7,408 7,186 7,502 8,387 8,503 7,538 7,697 7,627 
Belgium/
Luxembourg 
6,150 7,633 6,023 7,491 8,232 7,107 7,782 7,789 8,606 8,122 8,406 7,577 
Canada 8,317 8,449 7,352 7,584 7,922 6,829 7,240 7,914 7,532 6,629 6,760 7,503 
UAE 5,292 8,644 8,478 8,637 9,116 5,628 7,506 5,190 10,599 5,376 5,224 7,245 
Greece 7,256 8,118 7,311 7,293 6,939 6,955 7,041 7,132 7,021 6,266 6,876 7,110 
Brazil 6,142 6,381 6,810 5,989 5,738 6,497 6,811 6,492 7,566 6,200 6,632 6,478 
China 5,481 6,120 5,859 5,741 5,600 5,710 6,051 5,880 6,601 5,415 5,083 5,776 
Turkey 5,517 3,758 6,424 4,762 4,177 3,392 4,250 4,878 6,091 5,819 5,191 4,933 
India 4,779 4,225 4,092 4,302 3,726 4,432 5,591 5,569 6,133 5,369 5,257 4,861 
Saudi Arabia 3,947 4,938 3,914 4,745 5,019 5,089 5,792 4,730 4,143 4,064 4,230 4,601 
South Africa 4,039 3,949 4,695 4,303 3,968 3,662 4,414 4,873 5,217 5,291 4,099 4,410 
Source: Calculated from BACI. 
This pattern is also reflected in the low technological intensity of exports from rising powers. 
Figure 4.6 shows the share of exports from SSA to each rising power at each level of 
technological intensity and its evolution over the period 2000–2010. 
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Figure 4.6 Export share by technology intensity 
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As expected, non-industrial products are an important share in most rising powers, but 
especially in Brazil, China, India and Saudi Arabia. This share has also been increasing over 
time in some countries but only slightly. The share of high technology intensity appears 
marginal for exports to all EE destinations for the entire period. On the other hand, medium–
low technological intensity exports also have an important share in India, China, Saudi 
Arabia, Turkey and the UAE. Medium–low technological intensity is likely to be the area 
where SSA has more potential to increase exports. Only Qatar has a very important share of 
medium–high technological intensity; while in Brazil, China, India and Saudi Arabia in 2010 
the share of non-industrial and low technology intensity imports from SSA represented more 
than 50 per cent of all imports from the region. 
Overall, the results suggest a pattern of SSA exports to rising powers based on low 
sophistication, non-industrial sectors and low or medium–low technological intensity very 
similar to the pattern that currently exists with OECD countries. While this is likely to be the 
result of supply and demand factors, trade policy in EE countries is likely to have played a 
role, given the traditional high levels of protection, especially in manufacturing products, for 
most of rising powers. 
4.4.5 Final comments on development impact 
While these are only a few elements at a more macro level about the potential development 
footprint of rising powers’ engagement in SSA, the analysis suggests that FDI potentially has 
a more positive impact than trade. While a growing relationship with the rising powers has 
proved positive for SSA in terms of export earnings, export patterns with rising powers seem 
to accentuate negative structural change in the region, and given the increasing importance 
of the rising powers as destination markets this is likely to increase in the future. As a result, 
most of the impact of rising powers’ economic engagement is likely to be localised in the 
potential for FDI, in addition to other flows not explored in this paper, such as finance or 
technology transfer. 
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5 Conclusions 
This paper has analysed the economic engagement footprint of rising powers in SSA. In so 
doing and in line with the South–South cooperation framework, we go beyond the analysis of 
aid flows to include FDI and trade flows. Several important elements arise from the footprint. 
First, rising powers are important economic partners, especially regarding trade flows and 
investment. China is the main trade partner and the rising powers have been rapidly 
increasing their trade share at the expense of OECD countries. India, China, South Africa 
and the Gulf states are also important sources of FDI in the region. Regarding aid flows, 
mainly China and to a lesser extent India and the Gulf states are significant donors in the 
region. This is likely to be because some rising powers use instruments for development 
cooperation other than those that are considered ‘development assistance’ under the OECD 
DAC framework. 
Second, while exports from SSA to these countries are very much concentrated in natural 
resources, imports, FDI and aid are allocated in different sectors and different countries 
reflecting different objectives and production structures in the rising powers. One element to 
be highlighted is the extent to which a significant number of FDI projects from rising powers, 
especially for India, South Africa and the Gulf states concentrate in services. In addition, the 
nature of this engagement between rising powers and SSA is strengthening, since all flows 
are increasing over time. 
Third, the rising powers are not a homogenous group in terms of economic engagement; and 
not even the BICS countries are a homogenous group. While trade flows, especially exports 
from SSA, show more similarity, there are significant differences in terms of aid flows and 
FDI. These differences are also more important regarding BICS and Gulf states or Turkey. 
Fourth, rising powers are not so different in their country and sector engagement from many 
OECD countries. Significant similarities appear, especially regarding trade flows and less so 
in investment between some rising powers and some OECD countries. Interestingly, this is 
also reflected in the aid allocation across SSA countries in terms of the recipient 
characteristics. While allocation of rising powers is perhaps more concentrated in natural 
resource-intensive countries and countries with larger UN affinity, contrary to what some 
commentators suggest, rising powers such as China or India are not significantly more 
concentrated in countries with higher income per capita, corruption or trade links than some 
OECD countries. 
Fifth and looking forward, the importance of rising power engagement in SSA is likely to 
increase in the near future given the recent trends and economic difficulties in OECD 
countries. Regarding trade flows, this engagement does not appear particularly beneficial for 
SSA countries in terms of the sophistication and technological content of exports, export 
diversification or integration in global value chains. For aid flows, there appear to be some 
complementarities between rising power priorities and other traditional donors, although 
there is also significant overlapping in other sectors such as infrastructure. Finally, it is 
probably FDI flows from rising powers, especially investments in services, which are likely to 
become a significant opportunity for growth in the SSA region. 
Overall, the economic engagement footprint suggests that neither rising powers nor BICS are 
a distinctive group in terms of economic engagement in SSA, or are significantly distinctive 
from other OECD traditional donors. Therefore, the South–South cooperation framework 
does not clearly translate into significant similarities among rising powers and differences 
between rising powers and OECD countries in country or sector allocation of trade, FDI and 
aid flows. 
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While these results appear quite robust, it is important to emphasise that the scope of this 
analysis does not include all flows emanating from rising power engagement in SSA. Other 
types of flows such as migration, technology and, especially, other forms of development 
finance and assistance are an important part of the economic engagement footprint of these 
countries in SSA. As a result, it is important to collect data on these flows to finish building 
the picture of the footprint. Moreover, it is critical to improve the quality of the data on aid 
flows and sector and country FDI. 
The findings of the paper do not suggest the South–South cooperation framework is 
irrelevant to development impact, but that, given the allocation of flows observed, this 
framework does not yet appear to be distinctive. It can be argued that this cooperation 
framework is not only about sector and country allocation of flows, but also about political 
engagement and cooperation, bilateral frameworks, and how aid and investment projects are 
selected and implemented. However, in order to understand whether this form of cooperation 
is expected to impact development ‘differently’ from other forms of cooperation and move 
from development rhetoric, it is necessary to understand the relevant micro channels through 
which this framework is likely to operate differently and evaluate its impact. More work is 
required to understand and quantify these micro channels and evaluate projects under this 
cooperation framework in comparison to traditional donor projects. 
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Appendix 1 Concentration curves rising 
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Appendix 1 (cont’d.) 
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Appendix 1 (cont’d.) 
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Appendix 2 Concentration curves: selected 
OECD countries 
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Appendix 3 Similarity matrices 
Use SACU for Tables A3.1-3.4 but South Africa for A3.5-3.7 
Table A3.1 Average FK similarity index – HS-2 chapters selected rising powers and OECD imports from SSA 
countries 
 Canada China France Germany India Japan Kuwait Norway Qatar Korea Saudi 
Arabia 
SACU Turkey USA UAE UK 
Brazil 0.5784 0.7708 0.5400 0.3262 0.5843 0.3851 0.0821 0.1017 0.1033 0.5567 0.1605 0.4770 0.2912 0.8405 0.2338 0.1967 
Canada  0.6199 0.7866 0.6334 0.6227 0.5574 0.2150 0.2408 0.2956 0.6056 0.3137 0.5995 0.4949 0.6691 0.4110 0.4283 
China   0.5794 0.4117 0.6274 0.5091 0.1233 0.2048 0.1184 0.6539 0.2013 0.5575 0.3327 0.7945 0.2670 0.2356 
France    0.6191 0.5708 0.5650 0.2611 0.2201 0.3032 0.5321 0.3285 0.5827 0.4691 0.6297 0.4085 0.4742 
Germany     0.4412 0.5890 0.2744 0.2992 0.3580 0.4965 0.4145 0.5058 0.5487 0.4340 0.4953 0.5335 
India      0.5221 0.1680 0.1559 0.1928 0.5727 0.2969 0.5857 0.4628 0.6490 0.3915 0.4522 
Japan       0.2156 0.2522 0.2289 0.5943 0.3874 0.6402 0.5301 0.4809 0.4857 0.5336 
Kuwait        0.1764 0.4539 0.2590 0.4236 0.1668 0.2056 0.1182 0.3440 0.2426 
Norway         0.1737 0.2285 0.2655 0.2172 0.1454 0.1333 0.1974 0.2392 
Qatar          0.1903 0.3249 0.1850 0.2331 0.1424 0.3846 0.2798 
Korea           0.4050 0.5881 0.3807 0.6101 0.3806 0.3369 
Saudi Arabia            0.3284 0.3226 0.2365 0.4375 0.4111 
SACU             0.5389 0.5675 0.4971 0.5363 
Turkey              0.3585 0.5296 0.5776 
USA               0.3073 0.3254 
UAE                0.5553 
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Table A3.2 Average FK similarity index – HS-2 chapters selected rising powers and OECD exports to SSA countries 
 Canada China France Germany India Japan Kuwait Norway Qatar Korea Saudi 
Arabia 
SACU Turkey USA UAE UK 
Brazil 0.3797 0.3985 0.4928 0.4724 0.5099 0.3669 0.1704 0.2738 0.1555 0.3212 0.2417 0.6044 0.4750 0.4733 0.4486 0.4652 
Canada  0.4475 0.5701 0.5278 0.4359 0.3889 0.0794 0.3944 0.0767 0.3021 0.1401 0.4703 0.3952 0.6601 0.3881 0.5467 
China   0.5866 0.5688 0.5792 0.4496 0.0987 0.4119 0.0914 0.4002 0.1637 0.5408 0.5002 0.5298 0.4789 0.5718 
France    0.6840 0.6010 0.4758 0.1293 0.4993 0.1222 0.4034 0.2031 0.6453 0.5040 0.6773 0.5030 0.7132 
Germany     0.4991 0.6212 0.1037 0.4960 0.1006 0.4198 0.1739 0.5747 0.4515 0.7210 0.4638 0.7403 
India      0.3800 0.1982 0.3412 0.1487 0.3667 0.2847 0.6333 0.5846 0.5434 0.5383 0.5527 
Japan       0.0600 0.4414 0.0580 0.4922 0.1066 0.4146 0.3784 0.4597 0.3581 0.4579 
Kuwait        0.1065 0.3664 0.1163 0.8077 0.2280 0.1611 0.1250 0.5168 0.1569 
Norway         0.1084 0.4871 0.1494 0.4113 0.3630 0.4813 0.3560 0.5038 
Qatar          0.1299 0.3563 0.2349 0.1387 0.1252 0.3233 0.1440 
Korea           0.1714 0.3846 0.3714 0.3701 0.3597 0.3866 
Saudi Arabia            0.3087 0.2257 0.2092 0.5824 0.2348 
SACU             0.6122 0.5969 0.5850 0.6393 
Turkey              0.4492 0.4898 0.4879 
USA               0.4734 0.7270 
UAE                0.5233 
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Table A3.3 Average FK similarity index – export destination for EC and OECD exports to SSA  
 Canada China France Germany India Japan Kuwait Norway Qatar Korea Saudi 
Arabia 
SACU Turkey USA UAE UK 
Brazil 0.6245 0.6936 0.5504 0.5886 0.5744 0.5659 0.2913 0.5551 0.4208 0.5328 0.3856 0.3068 0.5947 0.7298 0.3412 0.7194 
Canada  0.7280 0.5493 0.6932 0.6391 0.7075 0.3923 0.4296 0.5946 0.4484 0.6071 0.3406 0.7157 0.7291 0.4605 0.7567 
China   0.6121 0.6841 0.7216 0.7089 0.3598 0.4726 0.5310 0.5367 0.5197 0.3313 0.7242 0.7505 0.4549 0.7727 
France    0.5129 0.5819 0.5323 0.2591 0.4926 0.3446 0.4686 0.3175 0.3077 0.5847 0.5699 0.3540 0.5549 
Germany     0.5469 0.7150 0.3609 0.4220 0.6815 0.4870 0.6539 0.2764 0.6177 0.7425 0.3529 0.7519 
India      0.6321 0.3649 0.4386 0.4911 0.4719 0.4696 0.4493 0.6608 0.6118 0.5874 0.6625 
Japan       0.3681 0.4951 0.6061 0.6119 0.5625 0.3450 0.6467 0.6935 0.4425 0.7174 
Kuwait        0.1910 0.4040 0.2354 0.3731 0.3110 0.3394 0.3560 0.3592 0.3701 
Norway         0.2725 0.5677 0.2555 0.3209 0.4445 0.5123 0.3394 0.4772 
Qatar          0.3261 0.6973 0.2550 0.5167 0.5756 0.4332 0.6070 
Korea           0.3123 0.2401 0.4847 0.5081 0.3063 0.5102 
Saudi Arabia            0.1754 0.5469 0.5376 0.4447 0.5737 
SACU             0.2998 0.3417 0.3566 0.3412 
Turkey              0.6450 0.4947 0.6567 
USA               0.3942 0.8339 
UAE                0.4265 
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Table A3.4 Average FK similarity index – import sources for EC and OECD imports from SSA  
 Canada China France Germany India Japan Kuwait Norway Qatar Korea 
Saudi 
Arabia SACU Turkey USA UAE UK 
Brazil 0.4092 0.2623 0.4442 0.3042 0.5620 0.2568 0.1548 0.1945 0.1503 0.2888 0.1417 0.3163 0.2217 0.6755 0.1749 0.2060 
Canada  0.4395 0.5665 0.6398 0.6067 0.5428 0.4368 0.4820 0.4369 0.5045 0.4202 0.3195 0.5296 0.5561 0.4592 0.5140 
China   0.4368 0.2953 0.3071 0.4059 0.2482 0.2833 0.2600 0.4314 0.3707 0.2057 0.2689 0.4727 0.3571 0.2560 
France    0.4829 0.5007 0.3519 0.2148 0.2946 0.2113 0.4038 0.2113 0.3923 0.3580 0.6339 0.2708 0.3560 
Germany     0.5813 0.7193 0.6021 0.6799 0.6168 0.5749 0.4931 0.2673 0.7567 0.4155 0.5641 0.7299 
India      0.4871 0.4056 0.4588 0.4239 0.4651 0.3946 0.3266 0.5045 0.6361 0.4517 0.4981 
Japan       0.6515 0.6730 0.6808 0.5967 0.5810 0.1818 0.6819 0.3516 0.6119 0.7093 
Kuwait        0.7121 0.7547 0.5004 0.5797 0.0879 0.6591 0.2328 0.5752 0.7354 
Norway         0.7304 0.5074 0.4711 0.1213 0.7458 0.3117 0.5517 0.7401 
Qatar          0.4785 0.5465 0.0585 0.7178 0.2307 0.5966 0.7586 
Korea           0.5024 0.1942 0.5278 0.4260 0.5000 0.5135 
Saudi Arabia            0.1167 0.4894 0.2222 0.5945 0.5014 
SACU             0.1929 0.3986 0.1882 0.1879 
Turkey              0.3164 0.5678 0.7817 
USA               0.2605 0.3064 
UAE                0.6103 
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Table A3.5 Average FK similarity index – country aid allocation for selected EC and OECD countries in SSA 
 Canada China France Germany India Japan Kuwait Norway  Korea 
Saudi 
Arabia 
South 
Africa USA UAE UK 
Brazil 0.1149 0.1257 0.0794 0.1000 0.0803 0.0913 0.0684 0.1326 0.2057 0.0571 0.0285 0.0978 0.0390 0.0865 
Canada  0.4363 0.3629 0.5559 0.2784 0.5321 0.2644 0.4896 0.3629 0.1385 0.1070 0.4739 0.0948 0.5334 
China   0.2764 0.4033 0.1906 0.4032 0.2120 0.3926 0.3944 0.1271 0.0909 0.4054 0.1766 0.4021 
France    0.5096 0.1716 0.3699 0.1678 0.1705 0.1854 0.0888 0.0635 0.2567 0.0474 0.2277 
Germany     0.1947 0.5567 0.2027 0.4151 0.3284 0.0995 0.1191 0.4731 0.0760 0.5456 
India      0.1823 0.1922 0.2044 0.1623 0.1134 0.0467 0.2527 0.1758 0.1867 
Japan       0.2205 0.4651 0.3597 0.1318 0.1234 0.4323 0.0977 0.5273 
Kuwait        0.1921 0.2001 0.3887 0.1015 0.2135 0.2135 0.1850 
Norway         0.3099 0.1102 0.1393 0.5613 0.1610 0.5143 
 Korea          0.1118 0.0747 0.3465 0.1008 0.3332 
Saudi Arabia           0.0061 0.1470 0.3516 0.1224 
South Africa            0.1896  0.1114 
USA             0.1385 0.4698 
UAE              0.0774 
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Table A3.6 Average FK similarity index – DAC 3 sector aid allocation for selected EC and OECD countries in SSA 
 Canada France Germany India Japan Kuwait Norway Korea 
Saudi 
Arabia 
South 
Africa USA UAE UK 
Brazil 0.2818 0.2041 0.1621 0.1389 0.1789 0.1017 0.2114 0.3977 0.1372 0.1357 0.1393 0.1197 0.1792 
Canada  0.3455 0.4683 0.1132 0.4204 0.1250 0.4810 0.3865 0.1176 0.1705 0.3526 0.1160 0.5378 
France   0.5900 0.1220 0.5024 0.1122 0.2903 0.2549 0.0860 0.0787 0.1962 0.1100 0.4234 
Germany    0.1460 0.5263 0.2142 0.4010 0.3183 0.1346 0.1126 0.3058 0.1234 0.4966 
India     0.1536 0.0823 0.1622 0.1875 0.1914 0.1169 0.0499 0.3077 0.0785 
Japan      0.3193 0.2976 0.2652 0.1589 0.0983 0.2484 0.1213 0.4631 
Kuwait       0.0606 0.1766 0.3890  0.1258 0.3141 0.0903 
Norway        0.3352 0.0682 0.1336 0.3625 0.1678 0.4633 
Korea         0.2231 0.2628 0.2283 0.1678 0.2590 
Saudi Arabia          0.2103 0.0435 0.3632 0.0590 
South Africa           0.0847 0.1126 0.1079 
USA            0.0494 0.3325 
UAE             0.1318 
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Table A3.7 Average FK similarity index – FDI sector allocation for selected EC and OECD countries in SSA  
 (based on number of projects) 
 Canada China France Germany India Japan Kuwait Qatar Korea 
Saudi 
Arabia 
South 
Africa Turkey USA UAE UK 
Brazil 0.3173 0.5853 0.4440 0.4448 0.3547 0.3329 0.0690 0.1678 0.3514 0.0345 0.2460 0.1724 0.3465 0.1499 0.3251 
Canada  0.3631 0.2957 0.2634 0.2963 0.2249 0.0797 0.1899 0.2530 0.0362 0.3244 0.2797 0.3218 0.2748 0.4370 
China   0.5439 0.4786 0.4866 0.4956 0.2727 0.3939 0.4521 0.2909 0.4727 0.2364 0.4907 0.3378 0.4723 
France    0.4963 0.5663 0.4056 0.2917 0.3417 0.3619 0.2083 0.4811 0.1333 0.6702 0.4346 0.5509 
Germany     0.5434 0.6244 0.1864 0.3028 0.2877 0.1102 0.4043 0.2102 0.4543 0.4665 0.4026 
India      0.4295 0.2823 0.3567 0.3526 0.2814 0.6099 0.1472 0.6328 0.5107 0.6665 
Japan       0.1358 0.2519 0.3250 0.1481 0.3633 0.1605 0.4004 0.3243 0.3034 
Kuwait        0.5333 0.0811 0.5529 0.3821 0.0667 0.2135 0.4385 0.2663 
Qatar         0.1477 0.5608 0.5359 0.1667 0.2456 0.4538 0.3548 
Korea          0.1081 0.2564 0.1892 0.3747 0.2221 0.3468 
Saudi Arabia           0.4683 0.2000 0.2362 0.2949 0.3470 
South Africa            0.3153 0.4998 0.5152 0.6285 
Turkey             0.1766 0.3051 0.2389 
USA              0.4376 0.6733 
UAE               0.5122 
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